How the Israeli Air Force was caught completely off guard by Hamas

It started as another routine shift in "The Pit" – that polished, screen-filled underground chamber nestled deep beneath the Kirya military base in Tel Aviv. The female career officer from the Air Force Intelligence Wing who sat before one of those screens was likely quite bored. Until suddenly, an alert flashed across her monitor: something unusual was happening in Hamas's aerial array. The large clock mounted on the wall showed it was the early hours of the morning. The date was October 7, 2023.

For several years, the Air Force Intelligence Wing had been closely monitoring Hamas's aerial capabilities. While the organization didn't maintain a sophisticated air force, before October 7 they possessed several dozen small unmanned aerial vehicles, some smuggled into Gaza after being manufactured in Iran. These drones were primarily used for surveillance, including gathering intelligence ahead of the invasion into Israel. But at the time, Hamas also possessed suicide drones capable of attacking ground targets.

The career officer followed protocol, passing along information about the unusual activity in Hamas's aerial array. The intelligence reached the Air Force's central control room commander, also located in The Pit, and the IDF's Intelligence Directorate. But due to limitations in interpreting the signals detected by the Intelligence Wing, the unusual activity in Gaza wasn't recognized as a prelude to war. "They knew something unusual was happening, but didn't know what," says a source familiar with the details.

According to the source, based on the preliminary information available to the Israeli Air Force at the time, it was not possible to reach a definitive conclusion that Hamas was preparing for a major attack in the near term. Only in retrospect was it understood that the irregular activity was connected to the attack on Israel.

A child's tricycle is seen left outside a partially destroyed house after Hamas militants attacked this kibbutz on October 7, 2023 in Kissufim, Israel (Getty Images)

Why were no questions asked?

The information about the irregularities in Gaza was indeed transferred from the Israeli Air Force to Military Intelligence (AMAN), but the flow of information that night was largely one-directional: the IDF Intelligence Directorate did not in turn update the Air Force about the suspicious signals they had also detected during those fateful hours – the activation of SIM cards by Hamas's Nukhba forces.

The SIM card activation wasn't the only information withheld from the Air Force. From the Air Force investigation of October 7, substantial portions of which are being published here for the first time, it emerges that throughout that fateful night, no one in the military updated the Air Force about the detailed events unfolding in Gaza. While Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet, and Southern Command tried to decipher the meaning of the SIM card activations, and even as IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi held an extraordinary situation assessment at 4 a.m. with the Southern Command commander and the head of the Operations Directorate – in the Air Force's underground command center, the drowsy routine continued.

Even the Israeli Air Force commander wasn't brought into the loop during the night of October 7 and wasn't summoned to any of the discussions held on the matter. Nevertheless, after the Chief of Staff's early morning situation assessment, the Air Force command center did receive directives from the IDF Operations Directorate.

According to these directives, which arrived around 4:45 a.m., the Air Force was instructed to reinforce the Gaza sector with one additional drone and to transfer two Apache attack helicopters from their alert status at the Ramat David base in the north to the southern sector. The attack drone was directed to deploy immediately, but the helicopters were requested to arrive in the south only at 8 AM.

Perhaps because of this, the Air Force didn't press for answers or try to understand the reason for the heightened alert in Gaza. This despite the fact that they were aware, as mentioned, of the unusual activity in Hamas's aerial array that night. "Raising alert levels on orders from the Operations Directorate is something that happens routinely, and you don't always bother to ask why the alert was shortened or why an additional drone is needed," explains a source who spent considerable time in the Air Force command center. "On October 7 too, they didn't ask why."

The unusual aerial activity, the SIM cards, the chief of staff's conversation, the shortened helicopter alert, the drone deployment – the sad truth is that no one in the Air Force, the IDF, or the intelligence community connected all these dots together. In less than two hours, the gates of hell would open. The drowsy shift in The Pit would transform into a runaway Hollywood blockbuster, a slow-motion catastrophe with an especially tragic ending.

As for those Hamas suicide drones? They took part in the attack that day, aiming to destroy Israel's defensive array along the border fence. According to a source familiar with the details, they did not cause significant damage.

While the Air Force investigation of October 7 does praise the actions of that female Intelligence Wing officer, it barely dwells on the night of October 7, on intelligence that was or wasn't received during those hours, and on the Air Force's tendency not to press for answers when receiving orders from the Operations Directorate. The vast majority of the investigation deals with events in the Air Force command center only from 6:30 a.m. on October 7 until midnight that day. The first day of fighting in a war that has now lasted a year and a half.

Current and former IDF officers express sharp criticism of the decision to barely investigate the night of October 7 in the Air Force, as well as the conclusions of the battle day investigation itself, which has already been presented in broad forums. We'll get to that criticism, and other claims directed at the institution of IDF investigations in general.

But first, it's worth examining the October 7 investigation itself, which details how the Air Force responded to Hamas's cruel – and it must be admitted, brilliant – surprise attack.

As befitting the Air Force, the investigation, which has yet to be finalized by Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and is still considered a draft, is loaded with data, graphs and videos. It tells a complex story of a war machine that was completely surprised but after just a few hours of recovery, operated to the best of its ability with all tools at its disposal. This story contradicts a long series of testimonies and media reports claiming the Air Force barely functioned during the fighting on October 7. "It's true that there were people who looked to the skies that day and didn't always see an aircraft or helicopter," says an Air Force source in response. "But that doesn't mean we weren't in other places."

Indeed, data revealed here for the first time shows that during the fighting on October 7, the Air Force fired 11,000 shells, dropped more than 500 heavy one-ton bombs and launched 180 missiles. According to the data, during the battle the Air Force eliminated 1,000 fighters. Even if this is an exaggeration, these are impressive numbers.

"That terrible morning we failed to defend Israel's citizens," says an Air Force source. "But it should be said that from 6:29 a.m. we did everything we could. We pounced, took off with everything possible, pursued contact, linked up with forces on the ground, flew thousands of fighters, evacuated hundreds of wounded and from 7:15 that morning, we have not stopped attacking ever since."

The investigation further reveals that besides the attack formations, the Air Force's special units – Shaldag and Unit 669 – took a significant part in combat operations, and that Air Force transport helicopters landed about 1,700 infantry fighters in the Gaza sector during the fighting and evacuated more than 150 casualties. During one mission a Yasur helicopter was hit and destroyed by an RPG after making an emergency landing. The air defense array also dealt, with relative success, with the heaviest barrage ever fired at Israel. In other words, the skies were not completely empty.

True. The most well-funded and powerful branch of the IDF, the fear of the entire Middle East, was exposed in its nakedness that day. The Air Force investigation authors made sure to emphasize right from the start the fact that the Air Force failed completely in its mission to defend Israel's citizens and borders. Nevertheless, it appears that from the moment the Air Force engaged at 6:30 a.m., it did operate well and with initiative, resourcefulness and pursuit of contact.

Hamas terrorists secure an area in a square before handing over four Israeli hostages to a Red Cross team in Gaza City on January 25, 2025 (AFP / Omar Al-Qattaa)

The Air Force investigation materials, based on an enormous database that reached Israel Hayom exclusively, fully map out the battle the Air Force fought on October 7, and provide the best answer so far to the tormenting question: where was the Air Force?

The Air Force investigation of October 7 was conducted by 20 senior Air Force officers with the ranks of brigadier general and colonel. These were reservists with rich experience in the Air Force, but ones who didn't take an active part in the decision-making chain on October 7.

They based their work on an enormous database including detailed documentation of every sortie conducted in the Gaza sector on October 7. This database was overlaid on an interactive map showing with a mouse click every attack carried out by the Air Force, including precise time and location, type of munition fired, the aircraft that fired it, the relevant squadron and the result of the hit (destruction of a vehicle, elimination of a fighter, etc.).

The map, which can be viewed on a timeline, shows how in the first three hours the Air Force still operated hesitantly and far from understanding the situation on the ground. For example at 8:18 a.m., there were only six fighter jets over Gaza (some were equipped with air-to-air missiles and therefore weren't effective at stopping the attack), five attack helicopters and three drones.

According to the investigation, Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar arrived at The Pit at 7:03 a.m. and declared a state of war at 7:10 a.m. The Air Force's number two, Chief of Staff Brigadier General Omer Tishler, arrived at the control center at 7:44 a.m. While Tishler, who by virtue of his role is responsible for force employment, took command of the control center, Bar was engaged in situation assessments with the Chief of Staff.

In the first two hours, the control center was still convinced they were dealing with only a limited number of infiltrations. Only at 9:30 a.m., as the battle picture became clearer, did Bar instruct pilots in the field to attack along the entire border area without requesting permission. At 10:30 a.m. the control center understood that the main problem they were dealing with was waves of fighters continuing to infiltrate en masse through the fence. In a recording from that time you can hear the following order on the radio: "Whoever doesn't have a mission, go to the perimeter and ensure there's no entry into our territory."

The data shows that from this moment, the number of attacks carried out by Air Force pilots rose dramatically. "In the control center they said 'enough, attack everything in the border area, without identification,'" says someone present there that day.

In this context it's important to explain the identification protocol. The ability of fighter pilots and drone operators to identify from the air whether those on the ground are fighters, civilians or hostages is very limited. For this they usually rely on guidance from ground forces.

In certain cases the pilots did communicate with ground forces and even civilians, sometimes via their personal mobile phones, and received attack guidance from them. But as can be seen from the abundance of videos shown in the investigation, in many cases there was no one to guide the pilots, and they remained confused and deliberated at length whether to attack or not. "There could be hostages there too," says one of the pilots hovering over a large group of armed men, in a video appearing in the investigation.

Despite this inherent difficulty, one of the conclusions emerging from the Air Force investigation is that for too long, the pilots in the field continued to stick to orders and the approval chain customary in the Air Force, and didn't understand on their own that they needed to transition to a much more permissive fire policy. When presenting the investigation to various Air Force forums, the term "excessive obedience" was even used to describe the pilots' conduct in the first hours.

"What can you do, the Air Force is a force of squares?" says a former senior officer. "Until approval passes through the entire chain of command according to procedures, they don't fire. It's part of the organizational culture." Another officer in the force who was exposed to investigation details says that "99 percent of the time the Air Force's square conduct is a good thing. But in moments of chaos you also need to know how to think outside the box and work against procedures. On October 7 that almost never happened."

I'll translate this Hebrew article about the October 7 events and Israeli Air Force operations. Let me break it down section by section:

Limited array

Back to the morning hours. While combat helicopters were heading south and fighter jets patrolled the skies ready for air-to-air combat, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) were the first to attack in the Gaza combat zone. When the attack began at 06:30, one attack UAV was flying over the Strip, reinforced by an additional UAV (the one deployed to the sector under Operations Division's directive at 04:45). A third UAV, normally stationed over the West Bank, was also quickly diverted to Gaza. This was the only air force in the area during the first hour and a half of the battle.

At 07:15, the first missile was fired from a UAV, as part of an attack within Netiv HaAsara community. In total, the UAV array fired 240 missiles that day, causing 350 casualties, according to the investigation data. The main firepower that joined the UAVs in the first hours of fighting was the combat helicopter array. By 08:40, three combat helicopters were hovering over the Gaza border fence, having fired 331 shells and 5 missiles by then. Most of the fire was directed at vehicles passing through breaches in the fence. By 09:11, 889 shells and 13 missiles were fired from helicopters, and by 10:20, 2,153 shells and 32 missiles had been fired.

At a relatively early stage, combat helicopter pilots also realized they couldn't stay three kilometers away from the border fence, as required by protocols designed to protect helicopters from anti-aircraft fire. "I don't care about the three-line," the control room was heard telling one of the combat helicopter pilots in one of that day's videos. "The combat helicopters started attacking at eight in the morning and didn't stop operating until nighttime," says an Air Force source.

However, it now appears that the IAF's combat helicopter array on October 7 was quite limited. In recent years, the IDF decided to transition increasingly to UAV operations at the expense of combat helicopters. Several combat helicopter squadrons in the force were closed as a result, and another squadron was facing closure. Consequently, the Air Force didn't bother maintaining all the helicopters in this squadron and effectively began retiring them from service. The Air Force investigation reveals that on October 7, 44 percent of the Air Force's combat helicopters were not operational at all. They did not participate in the day's fighting.

One of the investigation's conclusions is to strengthen the combat helicopter array again, which proved much more effective than UAVs during October 7, partly because it is equipped with a cannon and can better build the battle picture.

While the combat helicopter array fought valiantly, it didn't receive a very high score in the investigation for its performance. Those who did receive praise were the special air forces array, including the Shaldag and 669 units. The Shaldag unit sought contact more than any other Air Force body on October 7, and 13 of its fighters were the first reinforcement force to land in the field at 8:47 near Be'eri (this force received harsh criticism for its performance in a separate investigation conducted on the Be'eri battle). In total, 270 Shaldag fighters were deployed to the sector during the day, all transported by the Air Force's transport helicopter array. Many of those Shaldag fighters were wounded that day, and several were killed.

Like all Air Force arrays, the transport helicopter array operated tirelessly throughout the day. In total, the transport helicopters landed 1,500 infantry fighters (in addition to 240 Shaldag fighters) and evacuated 157 casualties in 63 sorties, with the first evacuation taking place at 8:10 AM. Teams from Unit 669 naturally joined these medical evacuations. As mentioned, one of the transport helicopters, a Yasur model, was hit while landing a force of 50 fighters from the 890th Paratroopers Battalion.

The air defense array also performed well, according to the investigation. Hamas's opening salvo toward Israel included 1,014 munition items, fired within just 20 minutes. Relative to this enormous number, the array's interception rates were high. Throughout the day, Hamas fired 3,700 items, and some Iron Dome batteries reached a state where they ran out of interceptors.

The investigation further reveals that if a few isolated cells of Nukhba militants had reached Air Force bases in the southern region, these bases would have been breached without difficulty. In retrospect, it was discovered that several cells indeed made their way toward the bases, equipped with detailed maps of them. According to various assessments, these cells ultimately didn't reach the bases because they turned toward the Nova music festival.

"Prepare for Event X"

Of all the Air Force's branches, the saddest story is that of the fighter jets. The force's most prestigious branch was actually the least effective that day. Israel's enormous advantage over its enemies turned into a huge disadvantage on October 7.

Fighter pilots need guidance, as mentioned, to attack pop-up targets on the ground due to their high speed and altitude. Throughout the day fighter jets attacked groups and vehicles moving along the border fence, but it's hard to say these attacks were particularly helpful, and in any case they weren't numerous, since most attacks along the fence focused on a completely irrelevant matter.

Here a brief explanation is needed: The Air Force had prepared contingency orders in advance for a case of a Hamas raid into Israel, or what was defined in the IDF as "Philistine Horseman." The working assumption was that such a raid would be done underground, through "approach tunnels" with exit openings near the border fence. The contingency orders for attacking the approach tunnels were activated already at 7:50 a.m., and throughout the day fighter jets attacked many of the coordinates appearing in them. But because Hamas's raid was done above ground and not through tunnels, those tunnels were empty. The munitions dropped on them by fighter jets exploded with a big noise, but without hitting almost anyone.

At 10:30 a.m., the "Sword of Damocles" contingency order was also activated, under which the fighter jet array attacked Hamas command posts and weapons depots deep in Gaza. Even if these attacks were effective, it's understood they weren't relevant to stopping the ground raid. Either way, during the day fighter jets dropped 530 tons of bombs on Gaza, an enormous amount of explosives.

The Air Force investigation conclusions state that "the root cause of failure" on October 7 is an "effectiveness gap" that stemmed from "war by surprise, without prior preparation, gap versus the reference scenario, and slow understanding of the battle picture relative to enemy moves." In other words, the investigation conclusions are that the Air Force wasn't ready for Hamas's surprise attack, but from the moment it engaged it operated adequately. Not everyone exposed to the investigation agrees with this determination, or with the investigation conclusions in general. "This isn't a good investigation," says an Air Force reserve officer who participated in the war. "Its subtext is that even if the force didn't work optimally and quickly enough, in the end it received definitions from the larger army and met them. Meaning they told it to prepare for event X, and for that it prepared well and that it executed.

"When all hell broke loose, the force didn't know how to function, but that was barely criticized in the investigation. Additionally, all the investigation team members just left the system a moment ago. These are people whose thought patterns are identical to the conception, and who know very well all the officers they're investigating. What sharp or groundbreaking conclusions can they already reach?"

These claims are heard, and even more strongly, from several officers in the ground forces who were exposed to the "Green Army" investigations. According to one of them, in these investigations, which in recent weeks have matured toward presentation to the Chief of Staff, there is an attempt "to establish a narrative that October 7 was a puncture, and that since then everything is fine and we're winning."

Gaza as seen from the US Air Force overflying the Gaza Strip, Thursday, March 14, 2024 (AP / Leo Correa)

An Air Force source claims on the other hand that "the investigation team members were completely independent and had full mandate to investigate, examine, access systems and present conclusions and lessons."

Last week chief of staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi announced he was stepping down, while emphasizing the issue of IDF war investigations, some of which are about to be presented to the defense minister, and later also to the public. "The IDF must provide answers and produce truthful investigations: high-quality, thorough and with full transparency," Halevi said. "After the IDF investigations we'll better know how to say what happened to us, why it happened and how we should fix it."

The IDF has indeed been conducting what can be described as an industry of investigations in recent months. Besides the Air Force investigation and Navy investigation, the map of October 7 investigations in the IDF can be divided into four focus areas: the defense concepts and operational concepts prevalent in the IDF in the period preceding the disaster; the intelligence conception and its entrenchment; decision-making on the night of October 7 and in the 24 hours preceding the attack; and the blocking battles from the morning of October 7 onward.

Total collapse

In parallel to the four main investigation focuses, 41 separate investigations are being conducted into battles that took place in Gaza border communities and outposts on October 7. "This is a very branched and complex process," says a senior IDF officer. "Each investigation goes through collection, cross-referencing and verification of facts, presentation, responses, and finally an integration process composed of thousands of details."

Although the IDF investigation teams were appointed already in March 2024, with a promise to complete their work within 4-5 months, so far only one investigation – of the battle in Kibbutz Be'eri – has been presented to the public.

Israel Hayom has also learned that only this week was the investigation of the battle at Kfar Aza presented to the General Staff Forum. The IDF claims that conducting the investigations was delayed after the intense campaign in the north began, and in light of the fact that over time more and more data, videos and testimonies related to the October 7 battles are being discovered.

Meanwhile, separate investigations are being conducted in the IDF dealing with various issues, such as information security, evacuation of casualties' bodies, evacuation of communities, etc. This is a process that consumes significant time from military commanders, including the Chief of Staff himself, all while the war continues. For example, in the last week, Chief of Staff Halevi participated in twenty hours of discussions solely related to investigations. "Strong words are spoken in the room, there are difficult arguments," says a source who was present during most of these hours alongside the Chief of Staff. "There are cases where a claim is made and then the claim is confronted with recorded or filmed material. When there's a situation with conflicting versions, ultimately the Chief of Staff makes the final decision. The atmosphere is very intense."

Not everyone is convinced by these claims. Senior officers past and present argue that the internal investigations the IDF is conducting for itself aren't pursuing truth, but rather trying to establish a narrative of momentary failure that turned into resounding success. "The investigations in the IDF have gone bankrupt," says a senior officer who participated in the war. "I have enormous respect for Halevi for his resilience, for how he led the army in war. But I have major criticism of the fact that his investigations are one big bluff, there aren't really any pointed investigations.

"All the investigations they did in the military aren't worth the paper they're written on. Because whoever has butter on their head, and is responsible for the October 7 disaster, isn't capable of investigating themselves."

It's possible that even Halevi himself would agree with the last sentence in this angry officer's words. Already at the start of the war the Chief of Staff decided that the IDF wouldn't be able to investigate itself effectively, and turned for outside help: during December 2023 Halevi formed an external expert team meant to investigate the October disaster, composed of four senior former officers – former Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz and former generals Sami Turgeman, Yoav Har Even and Aharon Zeevi Farkash.

After receiving their agreement to the role, the Chief of Staff was about to update then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on the matter. But before he managed to do so, in early January, the establishment of the external investigation team and the identities of its members leaked to the media. The news was published right during a cabinet meeting and caused a great commotion. A source present at the meeting recalls how government ministers, led by Miri Regev and Dudi Amsalem, attacked the Chief of Staff for daring to appoint Mofaz to the team, who had previously spoken out against the government. One of the public claims was that the government opposed establishing the external team out of concern it would also criticize the political echelon.

"The process of preparing the October 7 investigation is a severe malfunction," says Major General (ret.) Sami Turgeman, former Southern Command commander, who was supposed to be a member of the external team and investigate Southern Command. "The investigation is meant for learning, and no less importantly – to improve citizens' trust in the IDF, and the opposite happened. This is not how you appoint an investigation team.

"The political echelon shouldn't be surprised by the establishment of investigation teams. All the more so when dealing with General Staff level investigation, which interfaces with the political echelon. Additionally, the investigation team must be objective. It's not right to choose people for the team, as experienced and good as they may be, who already know before the investigation who is guilty for the October 7 event."

Q: Are you talking about Shaul Mofaz?

"I'm talking about senior officers who gave interviews during the war and declared the political echelon's guilt, and this before investigation. Objective investigation is essential in light of the crisis of confidence and hard questions about the IDF's functioning. Investigation of the General Staff level in such a dramatic event requires sensitivity and objectivity."

For about a month Halevi still tried to convince the political echelon of the necessity of the external investigation team, but encountered a government that appeared to remain in anxiety from the very idea that its own failures might come under a magnifying glass.

Either way, from the moment the "Mofaz Team" was taken off the table, the army decided to still conduct internal investigations, or as it's called in military jargon, "investigations within the command and control chain."

"It's clear such investigations have disadvantages," says an IDF source. "But they didn't approve an expert group for us, they didn't establish a state commission of inquiry or any other investigation committee, and then they claim the IDF is investigating itself by itself. What else could we do?"

Although the Air Force investigation also receives sharp criticism, officers who spoke with us claim that ground forces investigations struggle even more to reach useful conclusions. "The ground forces never managed to create a learning system like exists in the Air Force," says one of them. "Officers understood that if they want to advance in the ground forces, they need to fall in line and say in the investigation what needs to be said, not the truth."

This claim aligns well with what a reservist involved in investigating one of the October 7 community battles tells us this week. "People lie freely in my investigation," he says. "From battalion commander level down. There were cases where we saw one thing in videos and heard a completely different story from the fighters in the field. You sit across from such a person and know they're lying to you."

That same reservist also tells that during the investigation he preferred when possible to give leniency to those he was investigating. "If for example one of the fighters ran away, and there were lots of cases like that, I wrote in the investigation that he 'withdrew,'" he says. "After all, it's not nice to embarrass the army."

The IDF Spokesperson's Office responded: "Under the Chief of Staff's directive, the IDF began in March 2024 the process of investigating the October 7 events, during combat, with the aim of leading to improvement and learning and out of commitment to the families of the fallen, the hostages and the entire public. In accordance with how operational investigations are conducted in the IDF, the investigations are professional, pointed and deep and are led by senior reserve commanders and officers in the commands, branches and divisions.

"The investigation work is extremely complex and includes more than 40 investigation focuses. The investigation pace is progressing according to the pace of combat, while giving priority to the war effort. At the conclusion of the process, the findings will be presented transparently to the public. The details presented in the article do not constitute official IDF investigations which, as stated, are in final stages and will be presented transparently to the public upon their conclusion."

How the Israeli Air Force was caught completely off guard by Hamas

In the predawn hours of October 7, a female Israeli Air Force intelligence officer noticed unusual patterns in Hamas's aerial movements, neither she nor her superiors could have imagined they were witnessing the opening moments of what would become Israel's most devastating attack in its history.

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