September | News

Romania’s unemployment rate stood at 5.2% in September 2022, higher by 0.1 percentage points than 5.1% in August 2022, data from the country’s statistics institute INS shows on Thursday (Nov 3).

Industrial production prices for the total (domestic market and non–domestic market) increased by 46.7% in September 2022 compared to September 2021, data from Romania's statistics board INS showed on Wednesday.

Russia began to deliberately exacerbate the food crisis back in September when it blocked the movement of ships with Ukrainian foodstuffs.

Private lending in Romania in September went up by 16% from September 2021, to a total volume of RON364.7 billion, after local currency lending rose by 14.3% and foreign currency lending, expressed in lei, increased by 20%, in line with central bank data.

Stock indices posted sharp declines in September 2022, sending most international equity markets into correction territory at the end of the first nine months as investors’ fears about rising interest rates and the possibility of a recession in developed markets gain momentum.

Romania's annual inflation rate surged to 15.9% in September 2022 as compared to September 2021, data from the country's statistics board INS showed on Wednesday (October 12).

The number of real estate deals in Romania stood at 62,054 in September 2022, 3,668 more than in August 2022, data from the national cadaster agency ANCPI showed on Tuesday (Oct 11).

The prices of old three-room apartments in Bucharest went down, on average, by EUR750 or 0.7% to EUR108,350 in September. The decline is higher than the EUR150 registered in August versus July, shows the ZF Real Estate Index done in partnership with real estate consulting company SVN Romania.

New car registrations in Romania increased by 33.38% to a total 11,927 units in September 2022 versus September 2021, data from the association of automotive manufacturers in Romania (ACAROM) and of Romania’s General Directorate for Driving Licenses and Car Registration (DRPCIV) showed on Monday (Oct 3).

Romania's foreign exchange reserves increased to EUR43.7 billion in September 2022, higher by EUR860 million than in August 2022, central bank data showed on Monday (October 3).

Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan September 30, 8:30 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Russian President Vladimir Putin did not threaten an immediate nuclear attack to halt the Ukrainian counteroffensives into Russian-occupied Ukraine during his speech announcing Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. ISW analysts broke down Putin’s speech in a separate September 30 Special Report: “Assessing Putin’s Implicit Nuclear Threats after Annexation.” Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the illegal Russian annexation of four Ukrainian territories on September 30 without clearly defining the borders of those claimed territories. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declined to specify the borders of the newly annexed territories in a September 30 conversation with reporters: "[the] Donetsk and Luhansk People'...

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan September 30, 5:00 pm ET The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Anti-regime protests are continuing in at least 10 major cities in eight provinces and escalated violently in southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30. Protesters clashed with security forces in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, attacking local police stations and killing the provincial head of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) intelligence.[1] Social media users suggested that state security services deployed helicopters to abet their crackdown.[2] These clashes are among the most violent in the ongoing protest wave thus far. The security situation around Zahedan could worsen in the coming days and weeks, straining state security services more than they already are. Anti-regime militancy is common around Za...

September 2022 gaat de boeken in als een zeer natte maand. Gemiddeld viel over het land 130 millimeter neerslag, waar dat normaal gesproken in de maand september 79 millimeter is. Ook was het een zonnige maand, met een gebruikelijke gemiddelde temperatuur van 14,7 graden, meldt Weeronline.

 Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Nicholas Carl, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan September 29, 3:00 pm ET The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). The Iranian regime’s extensive internet and telecommunications censorship is severely limiting the open-source information available on ongoing anti-regime protests in Iran. Iranian state media and officials have confirmed that they are blocking domestic access to Western social media applications such as WhatsApp and Instagram to impede protester coordination and organization and limit the free flow of information September 22.[1] Iranian internet users reported restricted access to foreign domains—including Google—and difficulties accessing Google Play and Apple’s App store, preventing users’ efforts to download VPNs.[2] CTP cannot verify most protest footage circulating on social media. Iranian authorities previously blocked internet acces...

  Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan September 29, 7:30 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. The Kremlin continues to violate its stated “partial mobilization” procedures and contradict its own messaging even while recognizing the systematic failures within the Russian bureaucracy just eight days after the declaration of mobilization. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged and deflected the blame for repeated “mistakes” during the first week of mobilization in his opening remarks at the Russian Security Council meeting on September 29.[1] Putin recounted instances of mobilizing men without prior military experience, assigning servicemen to the wrong specializations, and unfairly mobilizing men with health conditions or large families. ISW has previously reported that Kremlin-state media began exploring similar complaints just days ...

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan September 28, 5:00 pm ET The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Circumstantial evidence suggests that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is at least temporarily unable to perform his normal duties. Khamenei has been unusually absent in recent days amidst countrywide, anti-regime protests, which began on September 16. Rumors have circulated that Khamenei’s health has deteriorated significantly since early September.[1] CTP cannot verify these rumors about Khamenei’s health, and such reports should be treated with skepticism. There are indications that Khamenei is ill or incapacitated, however. Regime power centers are behaving as if succession is either imminent or underway. President Ebrahim Raisi—a prominent frontrunner to succeed Khamenei—is positioning himself to become the next supreme leader with support fro...

  Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan September 28, 7:30pm ET  Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Russian milbloggers discussed Ukrainian gains around Lyman with increased concern on September 28, suggesting that Russian forces in this area may face imminent defeat.[1] Several Russian milbloggers and prominent military correspondents claimed that Ukrainian troops advanced west, north, and northeast of Lyman and are working to complete the envelopment of Russian troops in Lyman and along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in this area.[2] Russian mibloggers stated that Ukrainian troops are threatening Russian positions and lines of communication that support the Lyman grouping. The collapse of the Lyman pocket will likely be highly consequential to the Russian grouping in northern Donetsk and western Luhansk oblasts and may allow Ukrai...

Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Mason Clark September 27, 8:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Russian authorities in occupied parts of Ukraine’s Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts completed their falsified annexation “referenda” on September 27 and implausibly claimed that each sham referendum received between 87 and 99% approval from Ukrainian residents.[1] Russian officials pre-ordained and falsified the approval ratings and alleged voter participation rates for the sham referenda while coercing Ukrainian civilians in occupied territories to performatively vote for Russian annexation, as ISW has previously reported. Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely announce the Russian annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory on September 30. The completion of the performative referenda marks the last prerequisite for Russian Preside...

Special Edition on Russian Mobilization Frederick W. Kagan September 25, 6 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian military mobilization efforts. Significant inflections ISW would normally cover in its regular sections will be summarized briefly today and addressed in more detail tomorrow. Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to overcome fundamental structural challenges in attempting to mobilize large numbers of Russians to continue his war in Ukraine. The “partial mobilization” he ordered on September 21 will generate additional forces but inefficiently and with high domestic social and political costs. The forces generated by this “partial mobilization,” critically, are very unlikely to add substantially to the Russian military’s net combat power in 2022. Putin will have to fix basic flaws in the Russian military personnel ...

 Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan September 24, 9 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s declarations about which categories of Russian males will be exempted from partial mobilization may not reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions or orders. A Russian media insider claimed on September 24 that officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reprimanded military commissars in person for negligence in carrying out mobilization and sending out summonses in “excess,” and contrary to the explicit MoD guidance regarding exemptions for age, disability, or other limiting factors.[1]  Another Russian source claimed that certain heads of federal subjects acknowledged that they have mobilized citizens who are technically ineligible.[2] Responsibility for the partial mobilization appears to be divided and complex, possibly co...